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Krystof Kozak
1. Introduction
1 Political loyalty is one of the key demands that the modern state places on its citizens;
disloyalty  can  lead  to  disobedience,  threatening  its  very  foundations.  From  this
perspective, immigration has always presented a challenge for the receiving country, as it
tries to instill political loyalty in new migrants. State authorities have questioned the
loyalty of fresh immigrants, especially in times of international crises when ties to their
country  of  origin  have  become suspicious.  As  long  as  migration  flows  continue,  the
inherent tension between political loyalties to both the sending as well as the receiving
country will ensure that the issue of immigrant loyalty will remain highly controversial
and relevant in the debates about appropriate immigration policies. 
2 In this article I will address the question to what extent the fears of immigrant disloyalty
are based on reality. I will review the current literature on the issue and focus on the case
study of Mexicans migrating to the United States, where immigration critics frequently
resort to claims of real or potential disloyalty. This serves as a powerful argument in the
discourse about immigration, as it symbolically emphasizes the otherness of immigrants
as well as raises the specter of potential mass disobedience and disorder. I will present
possible ways of how to assess immigrant loyalty based on various sources of field-work
data, and apply them to the case of Mexican immigrants. I will then argue that current
controversies  about  immigrant  loyalty  are  based  on  an  outdated  understanding  of
political loyalty that does not capture the complex political as well as cultural ties that
are relevant for immigrants from Mexico today. 
3 Methodologically, I will first define a working concept for the term ‘loyalty’, with specific
emphasis on its political aspects. I will briefly mention episodes in U.S. history where
loyalty in connection with immigration became a major concern. The following section
will contain a review and assessment of current charges of disloyalty aimed at migrants
from Mexico. I will then present various available indicators relevant to political loyalty
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and apply them to immigrants from Mexico. The conclusion will discuss the findings and
present a more accurate framework for discussions about political loyalty today. 
4 The topic of loyalty is highly relevant, since immigration will continue to be a contested
political  issue,  particularly in periods of economic downturn. Both the perceived and
actual  loyalty  of  immigrants  will  play  an  important  role  in  debates  concerning
appropriate immigration policies. A more refined view of the concept of loyalty has the
potential to mitigate some of the tensions between pro-immigrant advocates and their
vocal opponents in academic and wider political discussions of immigration policies.
2. A Definition of Political Loyalty
5 Loyalty is a complex and contested term, but for the purposes of this article, I will rely on
the working definition provided by John Kleinig. For Kleinig loyalty can be characterized
as an associational attachment of a person to an object, be it a political leader, spouse, or
a  philosophical  concept.  Once  formed,  the  attachment  has  the  potential  to  distort
perceptions  and  attitudes  of  a  person  in  favor  of  the  object  of  loyalty,  effectively
committing them to defending the interests of the object even if  it  involves costs or
sacrifices.  Various loyalties  can come into conflict,  which forces  the person to make
difficult choices, especially when some loyalties are irreconcilable. Usually, loyalty can be
considered  to  include  also  an  emotional  component,  which  strengthens  the  primary
bond.1 
6 Political loyalty is specific as it includes also the aspect of political power, namely the
power of  the object  of  loyalty over the loyal  subject.  The modern bureaucratic  state
actively encouraged political loyalty through education or public ceremonies, as loyalty
to the state made implementation of laws and directives easier and helped to prevent
major  disobedience.  More  relevant  for  the  following  discussion  on  immigration  and
loyalty, the modern state at the same time became suspicious of persons whose political
loyalty was not so clear, be it for ethnic, religious, or political reasons. This mistrust often
developed into forms of discrimination, as those deemed potentially disloyal could not be
really trusted by the state and thus became de-facto second-class citizens.2 
7 The emotional part of the concept of loyalty is something of a problem. Even if people
acted with all due deference and obedience towards state laws and authorities, they could
still  be accused of disloyalty. Doubts about their emotional commitment could not be
easily dispelled, as potential traitors were believed to hide carefully their true loyalty
beneath the formally obedient facade.3 
8 The military draft  highlights  the aspect  of  power inherent  in the notion of  political
loyalty. The state was able to make men willingly perform acts that most of them would
otherwise not consider or actually even oppose by exploiting the notion of loyalty. The
draft is illustrative also of the different components of political loyalty - some understand
it as primarily complying with binding formal norms (I have to go to the army because it
is the law), while others emphasize the emotional component (I want to go to the army to
serve the object of loyalty). In cases of disloyalty, desertion can become a major problem,
unless mechanisms for enforcing formal obedience are sufficiently strengthened.
9 Political loyalty can thus be understood as an attachment towards a political entity or
regime,  which  enables  both  the  formation  of  a polity  and  provides  an  important
prerequisite for willing obedience to the norms formed by such a political entity. States
are in general sensitive to any signs of disloyalty, as it implies a waning of state control
and  an  increased  need  to  rely  on  a  more  vigorous  enforcement  of  formal  rules.
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Immigrants, whose political loyalty often undergoes a transition from their homeland to
the host country, are in this respect vulnerable to criticism by groups of native residents,
who see their attachment as lacking. 
3. Loyalty concerns and immigration in the U.S. context
10 In the U.S. context, it is important to note that political disloyalty to the British Crown
was at the heart of the revolution which led to the foundation of United States.  The
disobedient revolutionaries broke their ties and bonds with the King and defeated the
Loyalists,  who were not willing to do so.  Since then,  the new country has promoted
political loyalty among its inhabitants to replace any allegiances to other,  potentially
hostile political entities.4
11 For immigrants who fled adverse political conditions or outright persecution in Europe, it
was not so difficult to respect the more relaxed U.S. laws and regulations. Political loyalty
developed over time, especially in cases when the immigrants had made the decision to
stay in the United States. For those who came to the U.S. only in pursuit of economic
opportunities, the acquisition of a new political loyalty was more complicated, especially
if they planned to return to their country of origin in the future.5 In times of crisis, ties to
the new country had to be forged quickly. During the Civil War, able-bodied immigrants
were sent to the front as Union soldiers straight from embarking in the U.S.6 
12 Concerns about the lack of political loyalty of newcomers have been raised with varying
strength by some in the native-born population ever since the United States became an
independent country. They gave rise to the Nativist movement, which in a broader sense
continues to this day, again with varying degrees of political salience. Nativists wanted to
limit immigration to the U.S., and the issue of lacking political loyalty to the United States
became one of  their  important  arguments.7 Throughout  the  nineteenth century,  the
principal targets were Catholics and Chinese. Presumed loyalty to the Pope, which might
be stronger than loyalty to the United States, became one of the issues that led Nativist
advocates  to  formulate  ludicrous  conspiracy  theories.  The  election  campaigns  of
Catholics Al  Smith and John F.  Kennedy still  had to address this  issue deep into the
twentieth century.8 
13 Racism played the most important part in the restriction of Chinese immigration, but
loyalty  concerns  were  raised  as  well.  The  clustered  nature  of  settlement,  different
cultural  norms  and  incomprehensible  language  of  the  Chinese  engendered  fears  of
potential disloyalty or outright treachery behind appearances of being law-abiding.9 
14 Around the turn of the nineteenth century, the most problematic aspect in connection to
the political loyalty of immigrants from the Nativist standpoint became the radical leftist
political orientation of some of the newcomers.  Anarchists from Southeastern Europe
demonstrated a disregard for U.S. laws allegedly favoring the capitalist class and showed
little or no attachment to the United States political regime. The controversial execution
of immigrant anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti after a prejudiced trial in
1927  became  a  symbol  of  forceful  preemptive  action  by  the  establishment  against
potentially disloyal immigrants.10 Already in 1924, the National Origins Act drastically
reduced immigration. Loyalty concerns played an important role in the arguments in
favor of the restrictive legislation.11 
15 The Pledge of Allegiance is a relevant cultural product in this respect. Devised in 1890, its
use spread rapidly and was made mandatory in public schools by Congress in 1942.12 The
notorious wording “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to
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the Republic for which it  stands,  one Nation under God,  indivisible,  with liberty and
justice for all” includes the duty of obedience to political authorities. Frequent public
reciting was, as with a mantra, meant to influence the emotional side as well. 
16 From the standpoint of U.S. governments, loyalty became a critical concern especially
during wars. The 1917 Espionage Act and 1918 Sedition Act curtailed freedom of speech
and, for example, prevented both Socialist and German-American publications from being
mailed to subscribers. Disloyalty became an offense punishable by 20 years in prison.13
During World War II,  immigrants from Japan and their children became the primary
suspects for potential disloyalty in the atmosphere of fear following the Pearl Harbor
attack. Both immigrants born in Japan (the Issei) and children of immigrants from Japan
(the Nisei) were affected by an executive order sending them to detention camps. The
policy was even upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the notorious case of Korematsu v.
the United States.14 The treatment of Japanese-Americans demonstrated the precarious
position  of  immigrants,  whose  loyalty  is  automatically  questioned  in  the  receiving
country.  The exemplary record of  the 442nd regiment fighting in Europe,  which was
composed mainly of Japanese-Americans, was partly a response to this overreaction on
the part of the U.S. authorities.15 
17 During the Cold War,  national  security trumped other concerns,  and some groups of
immigrants were even welcomed for their anti-communist credentials. Apart from fear of
covert  spying  by  agents,  political  loyalty  did  not  become  an  issue,  especially  if  the
immigrants followed the strict anti-communist line in vogue at the time.16
18 In general, loyalty concerns in connection with immigration surfaced primarily for two
reasons. Firstly, periods of increased immigration of people from different cultural and
political  backgrounds caused Nativists  to  perceive  the newcomers  as  a  threat  to  the
prevalent institutional and political order. Secondly, immigrant groups from countries
hostile to the U.S. were suspected of subjectively preferring their home countries and
thus  being  potentially  disloyal.  Despite  these  two  fears,  various  immigration  waves
proved to be quite obedient with respect to the political system and, in time, even loyal to
the new country. In fact, the ability of the political system to incorporate newcomers
became one of the attractions of the U.S. for the outside world. 
4. Case study: Loyalty concerns related to immigrants from Mexico4.1 Allegations of
disloyalty
19 High  levels  of  immigration  from  Mexico  have  been  criticized  from  a  number  of
viewpoints – immigrants allegedly steal jobs from natives, cause wages to stay low, are a
drain on public resources, commit crimes or subvert U.S. values.17 Yet all these claims are
disputed on the academic level as well as within the public discourse. In this article I
review the available literature and data and focus primarily on the perceived lack of
loyalty of Mexican immigrants and their children, which is one of the arguments put
forward  by  critics.18 As  political  loyalty  has  great  symbolic  value  in  the  U.S.,  this
argument is quite powerful – the vision of millions of disloyal inhabitants inside one's
country is frightening for many U.S. citizens.
20 The accusations of potential disloyalty are coming primarily from what I call present-day
Nativists. The group is quite diverse and includes politicians, academics as well as NGOs.19
The key unifying message is a drastic reduction of immigration, especially from Hispanic
countries,  and  protection  of  the  white  Anglo-Saxon  dominant  ethos  in  politics  and
culture.20 The implication that the immigrant Latinos are "Other" and do not belong to
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the U.S. body politic is never far behind,21 effectively questioning their loyalty or even
denying the very possibility that the immigrants could feel such an emotion.  
21 On the political side, the Nativists are represented by Pat Buchanan, who almost won the
Republican party nomination for the presidential elections of 1996. To this day, he is an
influential commentator in conservative media. In his 2006 book titled State of Emergency:
The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America he explicitly warns that the U.S. Southwest
might become another Kosovo because of the presence of Mexican-Americans (Chapter 8
of the book has the title "The Aztlan Plot").22 Buchanan's sharp anti-immigrant political
standard was carried in the 2008 presidential elections by Representative Tom Tancredo
(R-Colorado)  in  his  unsuccessful  bid  for  the  Republican  party  nomination.  Other
prominent  Nativist  politicians  include  Representative  James  Sensenbrenner  (R-
Wisconsin), author of a highly restrictive 2006 anti-immigration proposal. 
22 In  the  media,  radical  Nativist  sentiments  are  presented  by  prominent  conservative
commentators like Rush Limbaugh and Ann Coulter.23 Rush Limbaugh came up with his
own Limbaugh laws on immigration: 
You're  allowed no demonstrations,  you cannot  wave a  foreign flag,  no political
organizing, no bad-mouthing our President or his policies, or you get sent home.
You're a foreigner.  You shut your mouth or you get  out,  and if  you come here
illegally, you go straight to jail and we're going to hunt you down 'til we find you.24 
23 The discourse is dehumanizing the immigrants to such an extent that it makes it difficult
to even imagine the immigrants as having any loyalty towards the U.S. Still, the emphasis
on political control and obedience betrays the hidden fears of potential disloyalty. On the
Internet,  an  active  and  popular  radical  Nativist  website  is  vdare.com,  where  illegal
immigrants are demonized quite explicitly.25 Among the Nativist NGOs, The Minuteman
project is perhaps the most radical, as it organizes armed vigilante patrols on the border
who are  rounding up illegal  border-crossers.26 Within U.S.  academic circles,  the late
Samuel Huntington was the most prominent sophisticated Nativist. In his article entitled
‘Hispanic Challenge’ he explicitly states his basic premise: 
The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States
into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups,
Mexicans  and  other  Latinos  have  not  assimilated  into  mainstream U.S.  culture,
forming instead their own political  and linguistic enclaves—from Los Angeles to
Miami—and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream.
The United States ignores this challenge at its peril.27
24 Even though he focuses primarily on the cultural  clash,  loyalty concerns are not far
behind when he emphasizes the regional concentration of the “challenge”. In his book
Who  Are  We? he  explicitly  mentioned  the  Hispanization  of  the  U.S.  Southwest  as  a
potential threat, effectively questioning the loyalty of Mexican-Americans.28 
25 Immigrants from China have also face disloyalty charges based on their connection with
the Communist motherland even though their socio-economic profile is quite different.29
Nevertheless, there are several factors that make loyalty concerns salient in the case of
Mexican immigrants. First of all, most of the Mexican-Americans are concentrated in the
region  which  once  belonged  to  Mexico  and  which  the  U.S.  acquired  by  conquest.
Therefore,  the  increased migration is  sometimes  referred to  as  a  sort  of  reconquista,
alluding  to  the  process  in  which  Spaniards  drove  away  the  Moors  from the  Iberian
Peninsula.  This  antagonizing  parallel  also  implies  less  respect  by  immigrants  for
restrictive U.S.  policies and enforcement agencies,  which are in the long run seen as
losing ground to the "reconquering" Mexicans.30
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26 The  historical  memory  of  the  humiliating  Mexican-American  war  (called  La  invasión
norteamericana in official Mexican textbooks) is kept fresh for Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans in the Mexican media and popular culture.31 To add to this historic grievance,
radical Mexican-American activists developed the concept of Aztlán, a supposed mythical
homeland of the Aztec tribe located in the U.S. Southwest. The concept of Aztlán serves to
highlight the connection of Mexicans to U.S. territory and, therefore, also their right to
reside in it on an equal footing with other U.S. citizens even if they might have an illegal
status  in  the  eyes  of  the  U.S.  government.32 The  widespread  attention  paid  by  the
mainstream U.S. media to wild predictions made by Igor Panarin, who claimed that the
U.S.  would  disintegrate  by  2010  and  parts  of  the  Southwest  would  join  Mexico,  is
indicative of the underlying loyalty fears that exist.33 
27 Many U.S.  Nativists  are  upset  by  the  notion of  Aztlán,  as  for  them it  threatens  the
political loyalty the Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Americans should feel towards the
United States.  Their fears relate to the possible annexation of  the U.S.  Southwest by
Mexico,  or the establishment of a hypothetical  República del Norte which would join
Northern Mexican and Southern U.S. states.34 Proponents of the concept of Aztlán, like
the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicanos de Aztlán (MEChA) or the more radical Nation of
Aztlán,  focus  on  historical  injustices  and  discrimination  perpetrated  by  the  U.S.
government  and  the  white  majority,  which  serves  to  emotionally  detach  Mexican
immigrants from official U.S. authorities and institutions.35 This only strengthens the
suspicions of anti-immigrant and Nativist groups. MEChA has been accused of promoting
separatism (which effectively means disloyalty) and racism on numerous occasions.36 
28 Sporting matches also highlight concerns about the loyalty of Mexican immigrants. When
Mexican and U.S.  teams meet  on U.S.  soil,  Mexican-Americans  and immigrants  from
Mexico overwhelmingly support the Mexican side, cheering and waving Mexican flags.
After  one soccer  match in  Los  Angeles,  the  support  for  the  Mexican team from the
audience was so overwhelming that it led to complaints from the U.S. team in the media.
The  underlying  concern  was  that  the  disloyalty  the  spectators  demonstrated  in  the
stadium was indicative of their more serious political disloyalty as well.37
29 Overwhelming  displays  of  Mexican  flags  could  also  be  seen  at  mass  demonstrations
organized  throughout  the  U.S.  in  May  2006  by  the  Alianza  Nacional  para  Derechos
Humanos against the proposed law that would not only increase criminal penalties for
illegal immigrants but also criminalize all those who help or assist them (such as religious
charities).38 The  fact  that  hundreds  of  thousands  of  illegal  immigrants  openly
participated in the protests  amounted to an open defiance of  U.S.  immigration laws,
which  further  raised  alarm  in  Nativist  and  anti-immigrant  circles.  The  widespread
presence of Mexican flags at the demonstrations suggested a breach of political loyalty,
especially in the U.S. where the national flag serves as a key symbol of loyalty to the
political system.39 
30 Loyalty concerns with respect to immigrants from Mexico also increased because of a
change in Mexican law in 1998,  which for the first  time allowed Mexican citizens to
acquire dual citizenship. Before this reform, emigrants from Mexico who acquired U.S.
citizenship automatically lost their Mexican one – the Mexican government was sensitive
to  the  issue  of  potential  double  loyalties  as  well.  The  threat  of  a  loss  of  Mexican
citizenship  was  also  the  reason  why  many  Mexican-Americans  kept  their  Mexican
permanent residency status and did not apply for U.S. citizenship even after spending
many years in the U.S. (thereby only increased the suspicions of the Nativists). The policy
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reversal in Mexico was intended to promote ties of Mexican-Americans to Mexico; several
million people are estimated to have acquired dual citizenship since then.40 
31 On  both  the  theoretical  and symbolic  levels,  dual  citizenship  poses  a  problem,  as
countries are quite protective when it comes to the political loyalty of their citizens. In
the event of a conflict between obligations owed to two states, it is not clear what the
person with dual citizenship would do.41 On a practical level the dual citizen can choose
which passport to present to the authorities, which usually makes bureaucratic life much
easier for that person. On the symbolic level, however, dual citizenship is a sign that the
attachment to either country is potentially compromised by other ties.
32 Furthermore, dual citizens are entitled to vote in both U.S. as well as Mexican elections.
One person can thus develop political affiliations with two different parties and cast votes
twice as often.42 Recent changes in Mexican electoral law even allow for Mexican citizens
residing in the U.S. to vote in Mexican elections at consulates throughout the U.S. Thus,
U.S.  permanent  residents  (who are not  entitled to  vote  in the U.S.)  and even illegal
immigrants can influence the electoral process in Mexico, but not in the communities or
states where they reside.43 As political participation is usually positively correlated with
loyalty to the political regime, the factual disenfranchisement of many immigrants from
Mexico is a worrying signal with respect to their political loyalty to the U.S. The ultimate
test  of  dual  citizenship is  of  course if  both countries should go to war,  claiming the
allegiance of the dual citizen from both sides. However, as military conflict between the
U.S. and Mexico is not realistic today, this is unlikely to arise in this case.
33 More important are concerns about crime. Present-day Nativists often cite an increased
propensity towards crime as the consequence of a decreased feeling of political loyalty.
According to this logic, the fact that even legal immigrants do not feel sufficient loyalty to
the U.S.  political  regime enables  them to commit  crimes and experience little  or  no
remorse  for  their  transgression of  the  law.44 As  criminal  law is  the  outcome of  the
political process within the U.S., the allegedly disloyal immigrants are supposed to break
it more easily than loyal citizens. 
34 Concerns about loyalty of illegal immigrants from Mexico are more acute, as their illegal
status in the U.S. forces them outside any system of formal rules and procedures. Seen
from the Nativist perspective, such people are already outlaws who are breaking the law
by their very existence – they can hardly feel any attachment to a political system that
criminalizes  them.45 The  fear  of  increased  criminality  serves  as  a  powerful  scare
argument in U.S. politics in general. Attempts are thus made by Nativist politicians to
connect  the  questionable  loyalty  of  immigrants  to  the  sense  of  danger  the  disloyal
immigrants are supposed to represent.46 This leads us back to the crucial question: Are
immigrants from Mexico really so disloyal? 
4.2 Basic characteristics of immigrants from Mexico
35 To address the potential  for disloyalty of immigrants from Mexico,  it  is  necessary to
provide a review of their basic characteristics as an immigrant group in order to set the
context. Approximately 43.4 million people residing in the U.S. consider themselves to be
Hispanic or Latino, forming around 15 percent of the overall American population. From
this  number,  28.3  million  (or  65.2  percent)  would  describe  themselves  as  Mexican-
Americans. Only 9.9 million (or 34.9 percent) of these Mexican-Americans were born in
Mexico,  that  is,  are  first-generation immigrants.  These  figures,  provided by  the  U.S.
Census Bureau, include also those illegal immigrants from Mexico who were counted by
the  authorities.47 Researchers  focusing  on  illegal  immigrants  estimate  the  illegal
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Mexican-born population to be around 7 million, out of an approximate total of 12 million
illegal immigrants.48
36 These  figures  illustrate  the  important  fact  that  recent  immigrants  from Mexico  are
merely  part  of  a  much larger  Mexican-American group,  which  is  quite  diverse  with
respect to the time they have spent in the United States and consequently also with
respect to the attachment they feel to the country. In fact, ancestors of some Mexican-
Americans were living on the land even before the U.S. acquired it in the aftermath of the
Mexican-American War in 1848. As a result of this diversity within the group, there are
varying degrees of assimilation and acculturation, which translates also into different
political attitudes. Without making this critical distinction, analysts and commentators
make the  common mistake of  focusing on recent  immigrants  and then extend their
observations to Hispanics as a whole.49  
37 A  second  analytically  important  feature  of  Mexican  immigration  is  its  regional
concentration. Border states with Mexico as well as big cities like Chicago and New York
have attracted a disproportionate amount of immigrants from Mexico. The population of
Los Angeles consists of 46.5 percent Hispanics, most of them of Mexican origin, while
Phoenix has about 41.5 percent. In recent years, Mexican immigrants started to disperse
into other areas of the United States as well, but this did not change the regional aspect of
their presence in the U.S. Even within cities, most immigrants from Mexico are usually
clustered in specific neighborhoods (barrios).50 The territorial aspect is important, as it
allows for analytical comparisons between regions with both a high and low Hispanic
presence respectively. 
38 A third important aspect is the dynamics of immigration flows from Mexico over time.
Mexican migrant workers have been a continuous presence in the U.S. Southwest since
the last half of the 19th century. Many of these workers were seasonal and returned to
Mexico  after  the  work  (harvest)  was  done.  Some  stayed,  gradually  increasing  the
Mexican-American  population  in  the  country.  During  the  Great  Depression,  the  U.S.
government organized mass deportations of persons of Mexican origin to free up jobs,
which affected up to 2 million people, including many children born on U.S. soil who were
thus formally U.S. citizens.51 
39 As  the  economy  recovered  during  World  War  II,  so  did  the  number  of  Mexican
immigrants, many of whom were part of the official Bracero Program for guest workers.
After the job market became tighter in the aftermath of the Korean War, another round
of  mass  deportations  called Operation Wetback occurred in 1954.  This  heavy-handed
effort did not stem the tide either. The liberalization of immigration laws enacted in 1964
and Mexican economic difficulties starting in the 1970s resulted in an increasing number
of both legal and illegal immigrants.52 
40 Persisting  economic  asymmetry  between  the  two  countries  and  extensive  migration
networks ensured a steady flow of people over the border throughout the 1980s and
1990s, despite increasing resources being devoted to border protection by the U.S. Border
Patrol. Economic integration under the North American Free trade Association (NAFTA)
failed to generate enough jobs in Mexico to curb emigration. As a result, the Mexican
economy  became  more  and  more  dependent  on  remittances  from  emigrants,  which
peaked at 23 billion USD per year in 2006.53 The number of Mexicans apprehended at the
border for attempting to cross illegally fell from the highest points of 2 million in 1998 to
858,638  in  2006.54 Yet  even  after  this  decline  it  still  remains  a  staggering  figure,
emphasizing the massive migration flows that cross the border. 
Are Immigrants Disloyal? The Case of Mexicans in the U.S.
European journal of American studies, 4-2 | 2009
8
41 As  we  can  see,  economic  incentives  play  the  most  important  role  in  explaining  the
immigration flow. Economic indicators are also highly relevant for the attitude of the U.S.
authorities, which are responsive to employer needs. The economic crisis starting in 2008
hit  the sectors  employing Mexican immigrants  especially  hard.  This  already led to a
dramatic decrease in immigration from Mexico, and many recent immigrants opted to
return home rather than be unemployed in the U.S.55 
4.3 Measuring the Loyalty of Mexican Immigrants
42 As the previous section demonstrated, Mexican immigrants are part of a larger group of
Mexican-Americans,  forming  a  diverse  body  ranging  from those  fully  assimilated  to
illegal immigrants who arrived only recently. It is to be expected, therefore, that loyalty
will  be  perceived  differently  by  different  members  of  this  group.  This  creates  a
methodological challenge, as some data is available only for Mexican-Americans or even
Hispanics or Latinos as a whole. Analytically, foreign-born Mexican-Americans living in
the  United States  are  more  relevant  for  the  original  research question.  Data  on the
subgroup of illegal immigrants from Mexico are important, as we would expect the least
amount of political loyalty in their case. With these distinctions in mind, we still need
some way to measure or at least estimate the level of political loyalty felt towards the U.S.
43 One possible method of  measuring political  loyalty is  by directly asking the relevant
group. In particular, the Pew Hispanic Survey has conducted various in-depth studies on
this and related issues, the results of which could be used. The answers confirm clearly
that attachment to the U.S. (which is related to loyalty) grows with time spent in the
country. Only one in ten Hispanic Americans keep very strong ties to their homeland,
measured by proxy indicators such as sending remittances, phoning relatives frequently,
and traveling to the country of origin.56 Signs of disloyalty with respect to the political
system appear only in the case of harsh treatment and discrimination of immigrants by
U.S. authorities, which the group considers mostly unjust and even illegitimate.57 On the
other hand, Latinos as a whole were quite active in the 2008 presidential campaign, which
is  an  indicator  of  political  attachment  to  the  country.  For  example,  one  in  seven
registered Latino voters contributed money to the campaign.58
44 Surveys also tell us that foreign-born Mexican-Americans are much less loyal culturally;
they preserve strong ties to their language and customs, and through that also towards
Mexico as their country of origin. There is, however, a clear distinction between loyalty in
the cultural and political sense, as allegiance to Mexico as a political entity is rather low.
59 For  that  reason,  the prospect  of  Mexican-Americans eagerly  wishing to  politically
‘secede’ from the U.S. to join Mexico is highly unrealistic. To add to this, an acceptance of
selected aspects of U.S. cultural and social life like a suburban consumer lifestyle or hip-
hop  music  among  Hispanic  youth  is  high,  complementing  but  not  replacing  the
attachment towards Mexican culture.60 In another survey, 63 percent of Latinos agreed
that it would be very important for future generations of Latinos living in the United
States to speak Spanish, which can signify both a reluctance to abandon Mexican culture
and a realization that Spanish has such a strong presence in some parts of the U.S. that it
would be a disadvantage not to speak it alongside English.61 
45 Apart from surveys, we can also estimate the level of loyalty by analyzing hard data on
various proxy variables and indicators related to loyalty. For example, serving in the U.S.
military can be considered as a sign of political loyalty, especially in a time of war when
the  risks  of  getting killed  or  injured  are  higher.  Therefore,  the  number  of  Mexican
immigrants enlisted is  relevant.  The available figures show that currently about 11.4
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percent of enlisted active duty soldiers are of Hispanic origin, most of them presumably
with roots in Mexico. In 1972, the same figure was only 3.4 percent, demonstrating a
considerable increase.62 At the same time, only 5 percent of army officers are currently of
Hispanic origin. As a disproportionate number of Hispanic recruits end up in the Marine
Corps, they are also more likely to be assigned to frontline engagements. It is therefore
not surprising that hundreds of soldiers of Hispanic origin have already lost their lives in
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.63 Many of them joined the U.S. military just to get
funding for college or expedited citizenship.64 The participation of so many Hispanics
(some of them foreign-born) in the armed forces is indicative of political loyalty towards
the U.S.,  even though the reasons for joining the military are often related to other
factors.65 The figures can perhaps be better used to refute allegations of disloyalty - if
immigrants  from Mexico would feel  no attachment to the U.S.,  we should observe a
greater  reluctance  towards  voluntarily  joining  the  military  and  thus  potentially
sacrificing one's life for the country. 
46 Statistics available for the Border Patrol are also relevant, as one could expect Hispanic
Americans to opt for other careers than to guard the border against other impoverished
Hispanics who want to improve their lives in the U.S. Also, pro-immigration activists cite
the brutality of the Border Patrol agents as one of their main concerns.66 In fact,  52
percent of Border Patrol personnel are Hispanic.67 Several factors might cause this high
figure,  such  as  the  proximity  of  the  border  to  the  areas  of  Hispanic-American
concentration or the requirement for agents to speak Spanish, but it nonetheless implies
considerable loyalty on the part  of  the agents to the U.S.  regime as a whole.  It  also
suggests  that  the  "us  versus  them" concept  on  which the  Nativist  agenda  hinges  is
inaccurate at best.  
47 Another potential indicator of loyalty is the extent to which Mexican immigrants with
permanent residency status apply for U.S. citizenship. For many years, migrants from
Mexico were mostly content to acquire just permanent residency status and did not strive
to  become U.S.  citizens.  However,  since  the  mid-1990s,  citizenship  applications  from
Mexican-Americans  have  kept  rising,  reaching  128,000  naturalizations  of  people  of
Mexican origin in 2007.68 Even though economic concerns, such as welfare reforms aimed
to exclude non-citizens from receiving benefits,  and the possibility of  acquiring dual
citizenship definitely played an important role in this upward trend, becoming a citizen is
nevertheless a clear act confirming political loyalty to the country as a whole. Questions
in the naturalization test specifically mention loyalty to the United States as one of the
promises of the new citizen.69 The ancient institute of oral promise aims to strengthen
emotional ties, but also includes the moral aspect of keeping the promise in case the
emotional component is missing.  The naturalization ceremony is in fact an elaborate
modern ritual, where the new subjects swear allegiance (and loyalty and obedience) to
the new country (and thus political master).70  
48 Data on crime among foreign-born Mexican-Americans should be examined, in order to
test the Nativist thesis that alleged diminished loyalty leads to a greater propensity to
commit crime. We know that Hispanics in general have higher incarceration rates than
non-Hispanic whites. Some Nativists thus cling to the essentially racist argument that
more  Hispanics  in  the  U.S.  automatically  translates  into  an  increased  crime  rate.71
However, they fail to acknowledge that, throughout the 1990s, when the numbers of new
immigrants from Mexico (many of them illegal) rose dramatically, crime rates actually
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fell  throughout  the  United  States.  Moreover,  African  Americans  have  even  higher
incarceration rates than Hispanics do.72 
49 Even  studies  by  the  Center  for  Immigration  Studies,  which  is  advocating  for  more
restrictions on immigration, had to admit that immigrants do not commit more crimes
than the rest of the population.73 Furthermore, not even illegal immigrants, who are by
definition  outside  the  law,  commit  violent  crimes  at  a  higher  rate  than  other
marginalized  groups.74 Other  detailed  studies  found  that  crime  rates  among  recent
immigrants are actually much lower than among native-born citizens.75 The thesis that
foreign-born disloyal immigrants commit more crimes than native-born citizens is thus
not based on any relevant evidence. Nativist advocates therefore resort to highlighting
prominent  cases  where  an  illegal  immigrant  is  the  perpetrator,  thus  sidelining  the
statistical  evidence.76 The image of  a dehumanized illegal  "alien" criminal  feeling no
loyalty to U.S. institutions or the American people thus keeps plaguing the immigration
discourse.
50 To uphold the claim that illegal immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, one would
have to include the forging of documents needed for gaining employment. Yet this is an
unfair argument in the sense that it is connected to their status as illegals in the first
place, and it does not in any way reflect actions or attitudes of the alleged "criminals".77
51 Further evidence supports the view that immigrants from Mexico are, by and large, loyal
to U.S. institutions and the political system as a whole. Massive demonstrations in May
2006 against restrictive immigration legislation, in which many immigrants took part,
were  peaceful  and non-violent  even though they  were  supposed to  convey  a  strong
political message and numerous illegal immigrants openly participated in the protests as
well. During the 1992 L.A. riots, immigrants from Mexico were more often targets than
participants in mob violence. Chicano radical nationalist groups modeled after the Black
Panthers (like the Brown Berets) were active in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but since
then most political activism is far less extreme and focused primarily on better conditions
in local communities or the general advance of Hispanics in U.S. society.78 Apart from
fringe figures or hardened criminals, it would be hard to find immigrants from Mexico
who could be considered truly disloyal to the fundamentals of the U.S. political system in
the sense of deliberately disregarding public order, even though their ties to the country
are still limited.
52 After examining several proxy measures of political loyalty of Mexican immigrants, we
can  conclude  that  in  many  respects  it  is  surprisingly  high  given  the  allegations  of
disloyalty described above. How can we explain this apparent paradox and what can we
learn from it?
5. Conclusion: Loyalty Concerns and Immigration
53 As waves of  immigrants continued to arrive in the U.S.  in the nineteenth century,  a
political loyalty to the new country, in the sense of obedience to the established public
order,  was sufficient for social  acceptance if  not necessarily equal social  status.  Even
though Nativism has always been present, as long as newcomers proved loyal to the U.S.
it had only a limited impact on the enactment of restrictive immigration policies. As long
as the immigrant demonstrated enough deference to political authority and accepted the
political system, he or she could preserve his or her customs and habits. Over time, ties to
the new country evolved into loyalty as well as acceptance of U.S. mainstream culture and
language, giving rise to the melting pot metaphor. This open model, based on the primacy
of  the  political  process  over  divisive  cultural  or  national  backgrounds,  proved to  be
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successful  as  it  allowed for the inclusion of  diverse groups.  The case of  exclusion of
migrants from China, however, demonstrated that cultural and ethnic prejudice could
override the emphasis on political loyalty as a precondition for acceptance.
54 Current  concerns  about  immigrants  from Mexico  demonstrate  that  the  immigration
model based on the primacy of political loyalty is under threat. By many standards, the
immigrants are quite loyal especially in the sense of respecting the political order, and
yet they still become targets of modern-day Nativist suspicion or even wrath.79 This can
be explained by looking closer at the concept of loyalty itself. From the Nativist point of
view, the immigrants from Mexico represent not a political, but rather a cultural threat.
Their perceived lack of loyalty is not to the political institutions, but to the predominant
U.S. cultural model as the Nativists imagine it (based on an Anglo-Saxon identity, the
English language,  individualism, rationality,  and self-reliance).  The persisting cultural
loyalty (meaning in this case primarily emotional ties) of Mexican immigrants towards
Mexico explains  the Mexican flags  at  sporting events,  which so  disturb some of  the
Nativists.80 These  expressions  of  cultural  affinity  are  not  necessarily  in  any  way
connected  to  political  loyalty,  but  can  be  easily  misinterpreted  as  such  by  outside
observers.81 
55 Apart from cultural  concerns,  the accusations of  potential  disloyalty against Mexican
immigrants are also driven by the notions of obedience and power implicitly inherent in
the concept of loyalty. As long as immigrants remain complacent, accepting the social
status designed for them by the majority, the issue of loyalty does not arise. However,
once they start demanding rights, they may easily be cast as ungrateful troublemakers
disloyal to the generous accepting country. This notion is based on the flawed assumption
that  political  loyalty  should  be  based on unquestioning  obedience  to  the  authorities
currently in power. However, forced loyalty oaths at universities in the 1950s or frequent
accusations of disloyalty against civil rights leaders like Marin Luther King demonstrated
that the concept could too easily be employed to suppress unwelcome statements. As
conceptualized by Hirschman, the protesting immigrants might be just exercising the
"voice" option, which can be consistent with the notion of loyalty.82 
56 The discursive use of Aztlán and Mexican flags in political demonstrations against harsh
anti-immigrant legislation should be viewed within this context as well. These are indeed
meant to bring attention to the fact that Mexican immigrants have been part of the
territory now under U.S. jurisdiction. However, the symbolism is applied defensively as a
reaction to stricter measures pushed by Nativists and their political allies.83 It does not
imply any active effort to disrupt the territorial integrity of the United States, nor to
engage in other acts of disloyalty to the country. 
57 This defensive attitude is driven by the fact that many Mexican immigrants are nowadays
formally in the position of second- or third-class citizens with very little in the way of
legal protection, even though they have been living in the country for years, making an
honest living for very low pay.84 Even though political participation and representation is
increasing, Mexican immigrants are still in an asymmetric position with respect to the
rest of the population. Restrictive legislation like the Secure Fence Act of 2006, which
mandated the construction of hi-tech fence on the U.S.-Mexican border has been passed
at  the  federal  level  despite  widespread vocal  opposition from the Mexican-American
community.85
58 We  can  thus  observe  in  the  case  of  immigrants  from  Mexico  that  political  loyalty
understood as a respect for basic principles and institutions of the government is not
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sufficient for present-day Nativists within the U.S. Additional demands for both cultural
loyalty and obedience get included as well. This development undermines the idea of the
assimilation process, according to which anybody could come to the U.S., and as long as
he or she remained loyal to the country, he or she would sooner or later become accepted
into its diverse community.
59 The case of  immigrants from Mexico,  who to some extent remain culturally loyal  to
Mexico and who are at the same time politically loyal residents of the U.S., raises some
important  theoretical  questions  with  respect  to  the  concept  of  loyalty  and relations
between individuals and the state in general. 
60 Firstly, how should we interpret the concept of political loyalty in times of massive trans-
border population movements? As long as expansive notions of loyalty, including also
cultural and emotional affinity and unquestioning obedience, are demanded as well, they
are bound to antagonize the significant immigrant population that would be unable to
comply. Respect for constitutional order and institutions such as that demonstrated by
most immigrants from Mexico should be sufficient to dispel allegations of disloyalty to
the country. The fact that a person has ties to two countries does not disqualify him or
her  from meaningful  political  participation in  either  country.  On the  contrary,  such
people might play a positive role in fostering valuable trans-border cooperation. 
61 Secondly,  how  should  the  state  treat  illegal  immigrants  who  are  quite  loyal  to  the
political and social order (even if they do so only to avoid any trouble with authorities)?
The repressive attitude of the state can undermine the loyal behavior of these residents
and disrupt them from developing positive attitudes towards the country. Especially with
long-term illegal immigrants, who are politically loyal to the country, the state should at
least recognize this loyalty and show basic respect for these individuals in return. The
concept of political  loyalty could thus be expanded to include a mutually reinforcing
obligation  between  the  resident  and  the  state.  Otherwise,  the  state  unnecessarily
antagonizes people who are inclined to respect it, in doing so risking losing their loyalty
(the "exit" option formulated by Hirschman).86 
62 Reconsidering political loyalty so that it becomes more limited in its demands and more
reciprocal in its scope would be beneficial not only for immigrants and their acceptance
and subsequent integration into the host society. All persons engaged in transnational
activities could benefit as a result of more relaxed and less exclusive demands for political
loyalty. Confrontational or discriminatory practices using potential disloyalty or outright
fear of the "Other" as their rationale only increase trans-border tensions and hamper the
process of immigrant integration. The case of Mexican immigrants, who maintain close
ties to their country of origin and its culture and, at the same time, show clear signs of
loyalty to the United States, demonstrates that mass immigration does not have to be a
major threat to the fundamental political processes and institutions in the host country. 
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ABSTRACTS
This article analyzes the concept of political loyalty in the context of mass migration flows to the
U.S.  After  exploring  the  evolving  notion  of  political  loyalty,  it  provides  a  brief  historical
background of concerns about the political disloyalty of immigrants in the U.S. Based on a review
of current literature and surveys, the case of Mexican immigrants as the biggest immigration
group is then analyzed in more detail. It is argued that even though immigrants from Mexico are
at times accused of potential disloyalty, they can be considered quite loyal, depending on the
selected indicators of loyalty used. This paradox is explained by the expansive use of the notion
of political  loyalty by modern-day U.S.  Nativists.  The conclusion argues for a  more inclusive
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concept of political loyalty, which would be better suited for the present-day era of large-scale
trans-border movements.
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